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Abstract 
The ongoing pattern of capital flows is quite unusual. All emerging market economies finance 
American consumers who live beyond their means. This is clearly a misallocation of world 
saving that is unsustainable in the long run. 
The present paper uses the INGENUE2 worldwide growth model to shape the conjecture of a 
growth regime for the first half of this century. The engine of growth rests on demographic 
and technological forces tied up together in a catching up process involving very large 
countries. In this process, capital flows will substantiate an intergenerational saving transfer to 
the huge number of people who aspire to get access to Western standard of life. 
Two scenarios explore the consistency of this prospect: a baseline scenario with relatively 
conservative hypotheses and a fast-growth scenario in China and India. In both scenarios 
Western Europe and Japan appear to be structural capital exporters with appreciating real 
exchange rates. The US will progressively save more and recovers a strong foreign net 
position. Meanwhile no scenario will prevent world growth from decelerating with 
demographic trends. 
Keywords: international capital flows, world growth, computational general equilibrium, life 
cycle hypothesis 
J.E.L classification number: C68, D91, F21. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the Asian crisis the pattern of growth in emerging market countries has changed 
drastically. They have shifted from deficit to surplus countries. Correlatively the inversion of 
capital flows has altered financial conditions in developed countries. Globalization has 
reached the stage whereby the macroeconomic equilibrium is truly worldwide. 
However the present growth regime is less than satisfactory regarding the allocation of world 
saving. The financing gap of consumers in the richest country by the saving of countries with 
much larger and growing human resources comes as a mockery of the Washington consensus. 
The misallocation of saving, which has led to the so-called saving glut, stems from the 
malfunctioning of the international financial system illustrated by the repeated crises from the 
mid-1990s onwards.  
Nevertheless the ongoing pattern of capital flows is clearly not sustainable in the long run. 
The engine of growth in this opening century rests on demographic and technological forces 
tied up together in a catching-up of huge populations. 
The present paper shapes this conjecture. For this purpose it uses the INGENUE2 worldwide 
growth model. This is a computable general equilibrium model dedicated to studying the 
pattern of financial flows and prices underpinning the sustainability of alternative growth 
scenarios. 
First we present a baseline scenario. It stresses the international financial position of the main 
regions of the world. Europe appears as a likely low-growth, permanent world creditor region 
with an appreciating currency. 
Then we make alternative hypotheses on the dynamic of growth in Asia. Shaping a scenario 
of faster catching-up in China and India, the model underlines the pattern of international 
capital flows and the structure of real exchange rates impacted by the momentum of 
development in Asia. 
Contrasting the actual and prospective allocation of saving, one can attempt to figure out in 
conclusion the changes in the international financial system to go from here to there. 
 
I. THE PARADOX OF WORLD SAVING IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE 
XXIst CENTURY 
Starting after the Asian crisis, world growth has changed its course. The shift has gained 
momentum since 2001. All emerging market economies except the CEECs have piled up 
current account surpluses. Amongst developed economies, Japan stands out in augmenting 
substantially an already high surplus in the 1990s. The abyssal US deficit has been virtually 
the single counterpart of all the cumulative surpluses (table 1). 
 
 
 5
Table 1. Current account balances in the main regions of the world 
(US $ billions) 
Countries or 
regions 
1990s average 
 2001 2004 
2004-1990s 
average 
United States -153 -388 -666 -513 
Euro Zone 20 13 36 +16 
Japan 107 88 172 +65 
Other 
industrialized -7 36 42 +49 
China 13 17 69 +56 
Other emerging 
Asia 9 74 124 +115 
Latin America -49 -54 16 +65 
CEEC -12 -17 -51 -39 
Russia 10 34 60 +50 
Rest of the world -22 34 117 +139 
Source: BIS, 75° Annual Report, chap.II, p.21. Because of unrecorded flows and other adjustment problems, the 
algebraic sum of current account balances does not amount to zero 
 
In all countries struck by a financial crisis, domestic demand has never recovered. Chronic 
excess production capacities have found their outlays in exports thanks to huge devaluations, 
which have wiped out the former overvaluation of their currencies. Primary commodity 
producers have benefited from the boost in US and Chinese demand.  
The rise of the Chinese economy is tantamount to a structural supply shift. China generates 
higher and higher saving and exploits a huge pool of labor to generate excess capacities in a 
large range of industries. In order to sustain the high growth rate needed to absorb the migrant 
rural workers year after year, China exports across the whole spectrum of industrial products. 
Being a very open country for its size, China exerts drastic competitive pressures on prices 
and wages all over the world. 
These structural changes show up in the saving investment balances (table 2). One can see 
plainly that emerging market economies finance advanced economies more and more. 
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Table 2. Sources and uses of world saving: financial balances 
(in % of country or region GDP) 
  
Countries or regions Average 1990-99 Average 2000-02 2004 
Advanced Economies 
:United States 
Euro Zone 
Japan 
-0.5 
-2.4 
+0.4 
+2.3 
-0.4 
-3.2 
+0.4 
+2.5 
-1.3 
-6.0 
+0.7 
+3.7 
Emerging Economies 
China 
Other Asia 
Latin America 
PECO 
-1.9 
+1.8 
-1.2 
-2.6 
-2.7 
+1.7 
+2.0 
+1.8 
-2.0 
-4.3 
+2.3 
+4.1 
+2.7 
+1.2 
-4.7 
Source: BIS, 75° Annual Report, chap II, p24 
 
The pattern of saving and investment is definitely at odds with the teachings of both history 
and theory. There is a sustained transfer of resources from the younger and poorer people of 
the world to the older and richer. If long-run trends are a guide for the future, the growth 
regime of the last few years is not sustainable. The opposite should be the basis of world 
growth in the decades ahead. 
 
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE IN THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION. 
Growth in the world economy is shaped by secular trends in its most structural long-run 
determinants. Two factors stand out. The first is the change in the demographic structure in 
the different parts of the world. The second is the diffusion of technological progress, as 
expressed by trends in total factor productivity growth. These factors have always been 
prevalent in the rise of capitalism worldwide. Mobility of labor, capital and ideas has 
intermeshed. The stages of capitalist development are connected with different directions of 
this mobility. 
• Demographic expansion, migration and economic development. 
In the late XIX° century there was an impetus to globalization prodded by a joint expansion of 
European capital and labor in under-populated overseas territories. The momentum was 
impressive indeed. For the average of the years 1880-1913 the net flow of capital exports for 
the total of 13 European countries reached 3.5% of their aggregate GDP. In comparison the 
same measure of overall capital mobility was 2% in the 1930’s and 1.5% in the thirty mighty 
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years after World War II. It rose again after the first oil shock to 2.7% in the early 
1990s[Taylor, 1996]. Then it turned negative as observed on table 2 where one can see that 
the advanced economies as a whole have benefited from capital inflows throughout the years 
1990 to 2004. 
The most striking feature of the world growth regime in the late XIX° century however was 
how complementary capital export from Europe and emigration of its population were. In the 
UK 3% of the initial population emigrated in the 1880’s, 5.2% in the 1890’s plagued by a 
severe recession, 2% in the growth years of the first decade of the XX° century. In Spain the 
figures were respectively 1.5, 6, 5.2% and in Sweden 2.9, 7.2 and 3.5%. These figures were 
very high for countries with a long tradition of capitalist development. But in the lands of 
immigration they were properly astonishing. Indeed in the 1890’s the population swelled 9% 
with immigration in addition to the natural expansion in the US, 17% in Australia and 25% in 
Argentina. 
It was a transplant of the European labor force that was young, productive and attracted by 
higher wages or entrepreneurial income as settlers. Because of capital imports, the expatriated 
labor force benefited from fast technological progress in railways and sea transportation, 
converted into low costs of the primary commodities entering into European manufacturing 
industries. Therefore the labor migration of the time entailed an international division of labor 
whereby the real cost of wage goods diminished in Europe, while emigration helped 
sustaining an increase in real wages after the turn of the XX° century. Meanwhile capital 
exports from Europe and capital accumulation in Europe occurred in alternate phases of the 
financial cycle, preserving a stable long-run interest rate. 
World War I and the ensuing monetary disorders, culminating in the world depression that 
fragmented international trade broke this world growth regime. It was not until the 1960’s that 
another pattern of world growth emerged. It was very different from the former. Huge 
institutional changes after World War II had rooted a self-sustaining growth process in 
Western countries. It was based upon a virtuous circle encompassing the baby boom, fast 
productivity gains, matching real wage increases, progressive social transfers and mass 
consumption. In the 1960’s trade opening under sequential GATT rounds enhanced a 
convergence club in OECD countries. This process entailed primarily domestic migrations 
from rural to urban areas. It was supplemented by immigration from the so-called Third 
World after completion of decolonization. This immigration was stirred on the supply side by 
the demographic explosion in the Third World, by the dislocation of traditional agricultural 
structures and by the deterioration in the terms of trade that spread mass poverty in the 
behemoth cities. On the demand side it was attracted by a chronic shortage of low-skilled 
labor in the fast-growing consumer durable goods industries. This migration pattern went on 
until the early 1980’s and in some respect still goes on, chiefly in North America and to a 
lesser extent in Europe. 
 
• New Prospect between demography and economy in the XXI° century 
 
In the INGENUE 2 model, population evolution is calculated according to a standard 
population projection method on the basis of historical and prospective UN data until 2050. 
We use our own demographic model thereafter. We aggregate the population structure across 
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the countries of each region with UN data from 1950 to 19951. We project fertility and 
mortality trends (for both sexes) at the region-aggregate level so that our own demographic 
profiles fit with UN central projection until 2050. Then our trends converge to a stationary 
population structure in the very long run in each region. 
 
According to these demographic forecasts, the world population reaches 9,3 billions in 2050. 
Population of the Indian world grows at a sustained pace and reaches 2,9 billions of persons in 
2050 (31% of the world population against 28,3% in 2000). Population of the Chinese world 
increases at a very low pace between 2030 and its culmination in 2050 (see figure 1a). As a 
consequence, the share of the population of this region in the world population decreases all 
along the first part of the 21st century, from 27% in 2000 to 22% in 2050. According to our 
demographic forecasts, in the next 50 years, the population of the Indian world will grow by 
70% whereas the population of the Chinese world will grow by 25%. One must note that the 
population of the African region is growing at the highest pace in our projections. This comes 
from the high fertility rates that characterize the countries included in this region. 
 
Figure 1a 
Population by regions  in the INGENUE 2 model (1950-2050):
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After the European demographic expansion of the XIX° century and the speed-up of 
population growth in the second half of the XX° century, the demographic transition will 
imprint the first half of the XXI° century. It is a sequential and lengthy process of aging. The 
developed countries, the Eastern European countries, Russia and decade later China, are aging 
from the top of the age structure. Most of the developing world is aging from the bottom of 
the pyramid. 
                                                 
1 In the INGENUE 2 model, the world is divided in 10 regions according mainly to geographical and 
demographic criteria. These regions are labelled : Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America, Latin 
America, Japan, Mediterranean World, Chinese World, Africa, Russian World and Indian World. The content of 
each region is detailed in Appendix.  
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When the world is broken in ten regions, according to the nomenclature adopted in 
INGENUE 2, a sharp contrast will arise in the rate of growth of the labor force. It will decline 
throughout the half century in Russia (very fast), Eastern Europe, Western Europe and Japan. 
It will decline more moderately in North America (after 2010) and China (after 2020). It will 
decelerate but grow until 2050 in South America, India and the Mediterranean countries 
(outside Europe). The most atypical region is Africa where the labor force will hardly 
decelerate at all (figure 1b). This pattern will differ significantly from the past. In the XIX° 
century Europe possessed both the capital and the human resources to conquer the world. In 
the post-World War II era OECD countries were leaders in the growth regime and attracted 
Third World population. In the upcoming decades emerging countries have the human 
resources for a new growth regime based upon a widespread, albeit not generalized, catching-
up. 
Figure 1b 
Working age population annual growth rate 1960-2050
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The conjecture is that the size and the dynamism of the population in large continental 
countries will become the preponderant factor in domestic development because their 
governments are aware of the need for investing in infrastructure, health and education. 
As the leading OECD countries concentrate the largest part of world capital, the growth 
regime will depend on international capital rather than labor mobility. An intergenerational 
transfer of resources via capital export from the rich aging countries to the labor force 
growing countries will make the world regions strongly interdependent. Figure 2 illustrates 
why this intergenerational exchange will arise. 
One can see that the proportion of high savers in total population follows a wave pattern that 
propagates from one region of the world to the next through the decades. The ratio culminates 
first in Japan as soon as 1995 and remains on a high plateau until 2030. Then North America 
will have its maximum in 2015 and Western Europe in 2020, Eastern Europe, Russia and 
China in 2035. They are regions where the labor force will decline and thus hamper growth in 
the future. On the contrary the regions found on figure 1 as the potentially fast-growing 
regions will see a progressive aging leading to an increase of the high savers ratio which will 
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not culminate before 2050. It follows that saving should flow from early high savers to late 
high savers in the coming decades. However, for this scenario to arise, an engine of growth is 
required. This is the international diffusion of technological progress. 
 
Figure 2 
High Savers Ratio (age group 45-69 yrs in percentage of total population) 
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III. TECHNOLOGICAL CATCHING-UP: CONJECTURE OF A WORLD 
GROWTH REGIME. 
History teaches the importance of mobility in labor, capital and ideas for the development of 
capitalism. In the forty years of the XX° century following the breakdown of colonies, growth 
per capita in developing countries was faster than in the one hundred prior years. It was very 
unequal however. Abramovitz [1986] pointed out that convergence to the higher level of real 
income, enjoyed by developed countries, was conditional. It was circumscribed to countries 
that had created the institutions capable of assimilating technological progress. 
The evidence that growth per capita is a complex social process, mediated by institutions and 
related ambiguously to demographic trends, has been portrayed in different stages of 
capitalism since the worldwide expansion in the late XIX° century. Before World War I, 
growth took off successfully in “new” countries where immigrants brought market 
institutions, a quest for personal wealth, the skill and discipline of industrial labor. At the turn 
of the XX° century, the US emerged as a dominant economic power. 
Growth in the thirty years or so after World War II was of a different flavor. With the advent 
of a wage labor society, a powerful upward trend in productivity was sustained by a huge 
migration from the countryside to the big cities of the developed countries. In Third World 
countries a parallel migration had mixed effects. In Latin America, for instance, poor and 
insecure people gathered in slum suburbs. Growth was very unbalanced. Inward-looking 
domestic industries were not often competitive and inequalities spread with the lack of 
infrastructures, education and social safety net. Only East Asia depicted a success story in the 
wake of the “Green Revolution”, albeit authoritarian regimes which had stifled the claims of 
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labor for a larger share of income for a considerable time. Despite the late suspicion of 
Western scholars about the low efficiency of Asian productive investment, the World Bank 
heralded the long-run export-led growth prodded by very high national saving rates. This 
growth regime came temporarily to a halt in the countries that suffered the financial crisis of 
the late 1990’s.  
 
• The spread of technological progress 
A synthetic measure of technological progress for a whole economy is total factor 
productivity (TFP) at constant prices. Estimating TFP is an appallingly difficult task for the 
ten world regions of INGENUE 2.  We define TFP as a Hicksian neutral technological 
progress in a Solow growth model. It means that there exists a production frontier shifting 
over time. In such a framework the aggregate product is a function of the services of capital 
and labor and of technological progress defined as TFP. Therefore the latter is computed with 
the use of the production function. 
The method used to compute the historical profiles of TFP for the ten regions of INGENUE2 
is outlined in box 1. Average growth of TFP for the decades compounding the second half of 
the XXth century is then compared with the results of two other studies by Bosworth and 
Collins [2003] and by Baier, Dwyer and Tamura [2004] whose results were aggregated in the 
ten regions of INGENUE2. The comparison is presented for the three developed regions 
(North America, Western Europe and Japan) in table 3 and for the two Asian regions (Chinese 
World and Indian World) that will be the engine of the fast-growth scenario in table 4. 
There is considerable uncertainty in computing TFP levels and growth rates. It is illustrated in 
the range of estimates shown in the tables. However if one concentrates on the last two 
decades when financial liberalization arose and structural reforms started in both China and 
India, our figures are most often within the range of those given by the authoritative 
researches mentioned above or close to one of them. Only for Japan in the decade 1990-2000 
our estimate is much lower than both of them. Our figures show a steady trend of TFP in 
Western Europe, a speedup in North America and a slump in Japan in the deflationary decade. 
A robust growth is sustained in India and the most impressive takeoff arises in China. 
The INGENUE2 TFP profiles are portrayed on figure 3. Several features are worth 
mentioning. The long productivity slowdown from the mid-1960’s to the early 1980’s shows 
off plainly followed by the sharp rebound prolonged by the powerful diffusion of IT. The 
Post-War sustained catching-up until 1990 in Western Europe and Japan was reversed 
because of the political shocks in Europe and the financial crisis in Japan that occurred in the 
1990’s. One can also plainly see the severe setbacks in the Russian world after the breakup of 
the Soviet Union where productivity collapsed and in Latin America where the two lost 
decades have caused TFP to stay put since the late 1970’s. The gloomy outlook in Africa 
where no takeoff has ever started adds up to the massive failures of development. In this 
mixed picture the performance of Asia since the early 1980’s stands out. A powerful 
dynamism, unleashed by economic reforms and trade opening, makes both India and China 
the only two continental countries to supersede American TFP growth in the 1990’s. 
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Table 3: Comparison of TFP estimates for the developed regions: 
(average annual growth) 
Western Europe INGENUE TFP 
 
Output per 
worker 
Capital per 
worker TFP 
Bosworth 
& Collins
(2003) (*) 
Baier, 
Dwyer & 
Tamura  
(2004) 
    (1) (2) 
1950-60 4,0% 1,8% 2,2%  2,6% 
1960-70 4,5% 2,0% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 
1970-80 2,2% 1,1% 1,1% 0,8% 1,6% 
1980-90 1,8% 0,8% 1,0% 1,1% 1,0% 
1990-2000 1,5% 0,4% 1,0% 0,7% 1,0% 
 
Northern America INGENUE TFP 
 
Output per 
worker 
Capital per 
worker TFP 
Bosworth 
& Collins 
(2003)(*) 
Baier, 
Dwyer & 
Tamura 
(2004) 
    (1) (2) 
1950-60 1,9% 0,7% 1,2%  0,2% 
1960-70 2,4% 1,4% 1,7% 2,5% 1,2% 
1970-80 1,3% 1,1% 0,3% 0,8% 0,2% 
1980-90 1,9% 0,8% 1,1% 1,1% 0,6% 
1990-2000 1,8% 0,3% 1,5% 0,7% 1,7% 
 
Japan INGENUE TFP 
 
Output per 
worker 
Capital per 
worker TFP 
Bosworth 
& Collins 
(2003) (*)
Baier, 
Dwyer & 
Tamura 
(2004) 
    (1) (2) 
1950-60 6,6% 4,0% 2,7%  2,5% 
1960-70 8,9% 5,1% 3,9% 2,5% 3,4% 
1970-80 3,4% 3,1% 0,4% 0,8% 1,9% 
1980-90 3,3% 1,7% 1,7% 1,1% 3,7% 
1990-2000 1,0% 0,9% 0,1% 0,7% 0,8% 
(1) 22 industrial countries (including Western Europe, USA and Japan 
(2) INGENUE computations by aggregating data of BDT (2004).   
(*) TFP = Factor productivity + Education    
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Table 4. Comparison of TFP estimates for Asia 
Indian World INGENUE TFP 
 
Output per 
worker 
Capital per 
worker TFP 
Bosworth 
& Collins 
(2003) (*)
Baier, 
Dwyer & 
Tamura 
(2004) 
    (1) (2) 
1950-60 3,0% 1,5% 1,4%  1,6% 
1960-70 2,9% 1,1% 1,8% 1,0% 1,4% 
1970-80 2,0% 0,7% 1,3% 0,1% -0,6% 
1980-90 3,6% 0,8% 2,8% 2,6% 2,7% 
1990-2000 3,3% 1,4% 1,9% 1,6% 0,4% 
(1) South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka)   
(2) INGENUE' computations by aggregating data of BDT(2004).   
(*) TFP = Factor productivity + Education    
 
China World INGENUE TFP 
 
Output per 
worker 
Capital per 
worker TFP 
Bosworth 
& Collins 
(2003) (*)
Baier, 
Dwyer & 
Tamura 
(2004) 
    (1) (2) 
1950-60     -2,3% 
1960-70 2,9% 0,6% 2,3% 1,4% 0,0% 
1970-80 3,0% 2,0% 1,0% 1,3% 0,2% 
1980-90 4,2% 1,8% 2,4% 3,3% 0,6% 
1990-2000 5,7% 2,3% 3,4% 3,2% 1,2% 
(1) East Asia (including China, Indonesia and Korea)   
(2) INGENUE computations by aggregating data of BDT (2004).   
(*) TFP = Factor productivity + Education    
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Box 1.Computation of historic TFP trends in INGENUE2 
To compute the historical profiles of TFP in the INGENUE regions, we use data from Vikram 
and Dhareshwar (1993) and from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2002). On the period 
1950 - 1990, Vikram and Dhareshwar (1993) give retrospective series of capital stock and of 
GDP in local currencies for 93 developing and developed countries. The Penn World Tables 
give main macroeconomic series from 1950 to 2000 for 209 countries. 
 
To describe the construction of our series, we use the following notations: 
Y = GDP in $ 1996 (Heston and al., 2002); 
K/Y = coefficient of capital (source: Vikram and Dhareshwar, 1993); 
N = working age population (Heston and al., 2002); 
ki = investment rate (Heston and al., 2002); 
α = share of capital in the production function = 1/3; 
δ = depreciation rate of capital = 1% (per year). 
 
These data are not available for main countries of Russian world and Eastern Europe. So for 
these regions, we use directly estimations from Baier et al. (2004). 
 
To compute the past series of capital, we use the following formula : 
 
Before 1990:   ( ) ttt YYKK =  
 
After 1990:  
tttt YkiKK +−= − 1)1( δ  
 
For each country, the TFP profile can be deduced as follows:  
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t
t
t
t
t N
K
N
YTFP loglog)log( α  
 
For each region, the list of available countries to estimate regional TFP series is the following: 
- Western Europe: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Ireland. 
- Northern America: Canada, USA, Australia, and New Zealand. 
- Japan 
- Indian World: India, Bangladesh (>1958), Sri Lanka, Indonesia (>1959), Pakistan. 
 
- Chinese World: China (52-00), Republic of Korea, (53-00), Singapore (60-96), Thailand, 
Philippines, Taiwan (51-98). 
- Mediterranean World: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia (61-00), Turkey, Cyprus (50-96), Israel, 
Jordan (54-00), and Iran (55-00). 
- Latina World: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile (51-00), Paraguay (51-00), Colombia, 
Ecuador, Guyana (50-99), Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Dominican Republic (51-00), Jamaica (53-00), Trinidad 
&Tobago. 
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- African World: Angola (60-96), Cote d`Ivoire (60-00), Cameroon (60-00), Ethiopia, South 
Africa, Congo, Dem, Rep, (55-97), Zambia (55-00), Zimbabwe (54-00), Mozambique (60-00), 
Mauritius, Malawi (54-00), Tanzania (60-88), Uganda, Ghana (55-00), Rwanda (60-00), 
Senegal (60-00), Kenya, Sierra Leone (61-96), Nigeria, Mali (60-00), Madagascar (60-00). 
- Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania (50-00). 
- Russian World: Russia. 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Total Factor Productivity (in USD 1996) :
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
N. America W. Europe Japan S. America Mediterranean
Africa Russia China India E. Europe  
Source: Ingenue 
 
• The hypotheses for a world growth regime 
The insight delivered by the above short review on world growth is that countries catch up 
unequally. The conditions of catching-up depends on social conditions that cannot be 
embedded in macroeconomic models [Abramovitz, 1987]. However demographic structures 
and the process of differential convergence in TFP must be depicted in models dedicated to 
explore the long run. 
It is not that easy to encompass all success stories and blips in a single explanation of 
catching-up and failure. Nevertheless two broad and intertwined processes are worth 
considering. Furthermore they are liable to modeling. 
First, the speedup of technological revolutions is a stylized fact that shapes trends of 
productivity gains. The diffusion of generic innovations has been taking less and less time 
from one revolution to another. A suggestion to model this feature is the following: the 
probability that a particular country takes off at a particular time is an increasing function of 
world income per capita. The latter is a proxy for the stock of technological knowledge 
already accumulated by the countries that preceded newcomers in the technological age 
[Temple, 1999]. The rationale for this hypothesis is the decreasing cost of acquiring new 
technology as much as the stock of technological knowledge available is accumulating. 
Second, whenever a particular country has seized the chance to capture and mobilize the 
opportunity to raise productivity at a sustained pace, one can make the simple hypothesis that 
it follows a growth regime à la Solow. The trend of its total factor productivity is the faster, 
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the larger the distance of its income per capita to that of the leader. This dynamic leads to a 
convergence toward the productivity level of the leader. Therefore the later a country begins 
its takeoff, the faster it can grow. World growth is just a weighted average of individual 
trajectories (Lucas, 2000]. 
Yet there are impediments to this process from the point of view of particular countries. The 
distribution of economic power between the social strata that compound the domestic 
economy may hamper the development of a class of entrepreneurs. Corruption and cronyism 
may hinder the political will and ability of the state to undertake basic investment in 
education, public health and infrastructures. The political elite may fail to create the market 
institutions necessary to benefit from the opening to foreign influence. These considerations 
mean that there is no one best way from technological diffusion to social change. The process 
is interactive and mediated by politics. The lack of a political leadership dedicated to 
modernization in embracing capitalism has often thwarted opportunities to start or thereafter 
to gain momentum in economic development. But a successful rooting of capitalist 
development is by no means tantamount to Western-style political democracy, at least for a 
very long time to come. 
How can we accommodate these ideas in the INGENUE framework? We assume that North 
America will remain the technological leader in the XXIst century, that the diffusion of IT will 
be completed in the whole economy and that there will be no further technological revolution 
in the baseline scenario. Therefore North America TFP will return to its long-run growth trend 
of 1.1% per year. With a 2/3 share of labor income in GDP, it means a 1.65% steady growth 
in labor productivity. This assumption may be dubbed too pessimistic. There is no compelling 
basis to make another one however. It should be understood that it is the reason why growth 
in our baseline scenario looks lower than other projections. At least ours respect the 
consistency constraints of a world general equilibrium model.  
For the rest of the world there will be a region-specific catching-up process in TFP. The 
differential speed of catching up reflects the discrepancies in the social and institutional 
conditions of assimilating IT in different parts of the world, combined with the levels of TFP 
already reached.  
The level of total factor productivity in the zone at the technological frontier (North America) 
is tA ,1 . It is supposed to grow at 1.1% per year: 1,1,1 )1( −+= tt AgA  with g=1.1%. The diffusion 
of technological progress to a zone i is given by the following equation: 
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The first bracket captures the speed-up in the rate of technological progress due to shortening 
the time of diffusion in technological innovations. It means that λ is an accelerator to the 
convergence in the growth rates (the chosen value is 0.001) The second bracket embodies a 
brake due to the difficulties to create the social conditions proper to assure a speedy diffusion. 
μ is the brake factor to the convergence in level. There is a caveat however. To make account 
for the attractiveness of Europe upon its neighbor regions we assume that these regions will 
converge to the European target. Therefore Western Europe, Japan, China, India and South 
America will converge to North America; Eastern Europe, Russia, Mediterranean world; 
Africa will converge to Western Europe. 
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Table 5: Exogenous Catching up (μ values): Baseline Scenario: 
W.Europe E.Europe Russia Africa Med. Japan China India S.America 
0.99975 0.999 0.99975 1.000 1.000 0.99975 0.999 0.999 0.99975 
 
Figure 4 gathers the profiles of TFP assumed in the baseline scenario in the world regions of 
the INGENUE2 model. It shows that Western Europe and Japan resume their slow catching-
up, meaning that they absorb the IT revolution after North America. The takeoff in China and 
India, which had already started in the 1990’s, will gain momentum. The rise of these 
continental countries to the status of prominent powers will attract whole regions (Chinese 
and Indian worlds) into commercial and financial integration. Eastern Europe will also be a 
fast-growing region due to its participation to the European Union. We take a dimmer view of 
the other regions. A relatively slow catching up is assumed in South America and the 
Mediterranean countries where there are perennial difficulties in establishing efficient market 
institutions, in promoting a large class of entrepreneurs and in generating non-corrupt and 
competent governments. The same arises more seriously in Russia where the catastrophic 
decline of the population is a further handicap. Finally we are more pessimistic about Africa 
where we assume no catching-up in level of TFP. Yet the rise in TFP at the same rate of the 
leading region, even if it will entail no catching-up, is a marked improvement on the last 
quarter of a century which has seen no progress at all and thus a setback relative to the rest of 
the world. 
Figure 4 
Total Factor Productivity : 1950-2100 (percentage of "North America" level) 
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IV. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BASELINE SCENARIO 
The baseline scenario is presented in emphasizing the results most interesting for the topic of 
the conference. After a brief outlook on growth, it mainly describes the saving investment 
balance in the ten regions of the model leading to the dynamic interdependencies depicted 
with three sets of variables: prices, net flows and assets. 
The dynamic path portrayed in the forthcoming figures is the outcome of the overlapping 
generations rational expectations general equilibrium model INGENUE2. A short non-
technical overview of the model is outlined in box 2. A technical appendix exhibits the formal 
structure of the model. 
 
Box 2. Non-technical overview of the INGENUE2 model 
The world is compounded of 10 regions: North America (including Australia and New 
Zealand), Western Europe, Japan, Eastern Europe, Russian World (including Ukraine 
Bielorussia and Central Asia), “China world” (China and other East Asian countries 
excluding Japan),”Indian World” (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka), 
“Latina world” (South and Central America and the Caribbean), Mediterranean (Non-
European Mediterranean countries, Near and Middle East countries), Africa (Sub-Saharan 
Africa). 
Overlapping generations: 21 generations overlap. Unit time 5 years, hence the maximum life 
span is 105 years.17 cohorts of adults and 4 cohorts of young (under 20). Cost per child 
proportional to the consumption of their parents. Exogenous labor supply adjusted for an age-
specific participation ratio in each region. 
Macroeconomic framework: 
¾ Household behavior: life cycle hypothesis + voluntary bequest left to children at age T 
subject to survival until that age. In the budget constraint, the expenditure side 
encompasses the consumption (costs of children included) and saving of each individual of 
age a at period t. On the income side there is the financial income on accumulated saving 
(if the individual of age a-1 at time t-1 has survived between t-1 and t) corrected by the 
survival probability of generation age a-1. This adjustment amounts to the mechanism of a 
perfect annuity market that pools death risk due to the uncertain lifetime of individuals. 
There is also a non-financial income which depends on the age of the individual respective 
to threshold ages: net labor income (after social security taxes) modulated by an age-
efficiency profile for people in full labor activity; a mix of labor income and pension 
benefits for people partially retired (reduced labor activity); full pension benefits for people 
entirely retired. The lifetime utility program is maximized under the intertemporal budget 
constraint, taking prices, social contributions and benefits as given. [Modigliani, 1986] 
¾ Public sector. It is confined to a public Pay As You Go (PAYG) pension scheme in all 
regions. It operates under a defined-benefit rule. It pays a proportion of the current net 
wage (replacement ratio) to retirees. It is financed by a payroll tax on labor income. The 
exogenous parameters are the retirement age and the replacement ratio. They are region-
specific. The contribution rate is determined so as to balance the budget period by period. 
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¾ Production system. Goods are heterogeneous. In each region there is an intermediate goods 
sector. It uses labor and capital to produce a region-specific intermediate good with a 
constant return-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function. The final goods sector is the 
product of a CES combination of a domestic intermediate good and a foreign intermediate 
good imported by the region from a world market (Backus and alii, 1995). This 
homogenous world good is “produced” by a fictive world producer as the output of a CES 
combination of all intermediate goods exported by the regions. All production functions 
are augmented by TFP coefficients. 
¾ Firm behavior. In each type of sector, firms act on competitive markets. They maximize 
their profit under their production constraint, taking prices as given. In the domestic 
intermediate good sector the constraint is intertemporal, since the production function 
depends on the stock of capital which is depreciated and accumulated. Intermediate goods 
producers thus maximize net present value of future cash flows, i.e. production value 
minus wage cost and capital cost. The latter depends on the depreciation rate, which is 
itself affected by international capital market imperfections. The depreciation rate is higher 
in debtor regions. More precisely the higher their net foreign debt ratio to their stock of 
capital, the higher the depreciation rate in those regions. Therefore this debt constraint 
increases the required gross rate of return on capital in debtor regions, which in turn lowers 
the demand for capital and thus the equilibrium capital/ labor ratio resulting from the first-
order condition. Other type producers face a more simple maximization problem. Domestic 
goods producers and the world producer maximize current profit subject to their CES 
production functions 
¾ General equilibrium. The capital stock in each region, the age distribution of saving in 
each region, the initial prices of domestic commodities are the initial conditions. 
.Exogenous variables and parameters are: the demographic profiles in each region that are 
outputs of the demographic upstream model, the coefficients of the TFP determination in 
intermediary and final sector of each region, the social security policy parameters in each 
region. The competitive world equilibrium stems from five set of equations: intertemporal 
utility maximization of households, intertemporal profit maximization of firms in 
intermediate goods sectors, period profit maximization of firms in final goods sectors, 
period profit maximization of the world producer, market clearing conditions. The markets 
for intermediate goods, final goods, labor in each region and the market for the world 
intermediate good are cleared in each period . These equations determine all relative 
equilibrium prices expressed in a common numeraire, which is the price of the 
intermediate good in North America set equal to one. This convention allows us to express 
values in constant dollars. Finally Walras’s law implies that the world financial market 
equilibrium is the redundant equation. This market is automatically cleared. 
 
• Regional growth 
Assumptions regarding technological convergence are conservative in the baseline scenario. 
Besides the parameters that define public pension systems perpetuate existing policies in the 
beginning of the XXI° century. Therefore GDP regional growth rates largely follows regional 
labor force growth rates. Two characteristics stand out (figure 5). Firstly there is a general 
slowdown in growth because the growth rate of the working age population diminishes in all 
regions but Africa after 2000. Secondly the dispersion in the growth rates is almost as large in 
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2050 as in 2000, because aging is a lengthy process with countervailing impacts on the labor 
force of less-developed countries. 
North America and Europe have growth profiles that partly differ from the general pattern. In 
North America growth decelerates precipitously in the first decade after 2000, because both 
the labor force and productivity do so. But the working age population stops declining in 
2025, recovers and remains stationary thereafter. It ensues that GDP growth rate converges to 
nearly 2% per annum, one of the highest growth rates in 2050. Europe (both West and East) 
and worse Russia have a somber future. Western Europe follows a similar profile to North 
America but at much lower growth rates. GDP growth decelerates fast after 2000 until 2030 
from 3.2 to 0.7% and keeps this mediocre performance until 2050. Russia is the region with 
the lowest growth rate almost throughout the half-century and ends up in complete stagnation. 
 
Figure 5  
GDP Growth rate (2000-2050)
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• Investment and saving 
Because the model works at full employment with an exogenous labor force, the stock of 
capital in each period is a rising function of employment adjusted for labor efficiency and of 
capital intensity (capital/effective labor). The ratio of capital intensity is itself increasing with 
TFP and decreasing with the gross return to capital. The latter is the sum of the regional real 
interest rate and the depreciation ratio. 
The regional net rate of interest is the sum of the world interest rate, which clears the world 
financial market, and of the rate of change of the region’s real exchange rate against the 
dollar. Those relationships proceed from the risk-neutral arbitrage in financial markets. The 
depreciation ratio is asymmetrically dependent on the ownership ratio (total wealth of 
households/ capital stock). An ownership ratio less than one indicates that the region is a net 
debtor. In those regions the imperfections of international financial markets raise the cost of 
capital the more the larger foreign debt is. It shows up in a higher rate of economic 
depreciation of the capital stock. In creditor regions (ownership ratio above one) the rate of 
depreciation is a constant, thus independent on financial conditions. 
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Gross investment rises with net capital accumulation and with replacement, which is 
modulated by the change in the rate of depreciation in debtor regions. Therefore in regions 
with a fast growth of the labor force and high foreign indebtedness, raising markedly the rate 
of economic depreciation, the rate of gross investment to GDP will increase until 2030. Such 
conditions point out Africa whose capital starts from a low base. India follows a similar 
pattern albeit less strongly. With a constant depreciation ratio, and an interest rate declining 
with the world rate, North America keeps a rate of gross investment to GDP remarkably 
steady. This is not the case of Japan and Western Europe. Despite the lowest real interest rates 
due to the continuous appreciation of their real exchange rates, leading to a low cost of capital 
indeed, those regions have such a declining labor force that it impinges negatively upon 
capital accumulation. Yet the rise in capital intensity counteracts the effect of the labor force. 
It is why the rate of investment declines less than it does in faster growing regions like China 
and South America. Finally Russia has a peculiar profile. In the early 2000’s investment 
recovers from the collapse of the 1990’s, which led to the scrapping of more than half of the 
capital stock. A humped-shape curve ensues. Nonetheless the Russian rate of investment, 
remains by far the lowest of all regions (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6  
Evolution of the gross investment to GDP ratio
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Net saving in each region is the aggregate of individual savings in the life cycle. It depends on 
the demographic structure (high savers ratio and dependency ratio), on the expectation of 
future income and on the parameters of the PAYG pension systems. Demographic 
determinants are prevalent. Regions with the fastest-increasing dependency ratios are the ones 
with the fastest-decreasing net saving rate, namely Japan, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, 
Russia. Meanwhile this gloomy demographic factor is compounded with a slow expected 
progression in income (figure 7). In China, India, South America and the Mediterranean, the 
high saver ratio and the dependency ratio rise in tandem. In the early decades, while the 
population is still young, those regions grow faster than more demographically mature ones. It 
follows that young people expecting higher future income indulge in debt, reducing the 
overall saving rate. Alike for investment, North America has a more steady saving ratio 
throughout the half century. 
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Figure 7  
Evolution of the Net Saving (in percentage of GNP)
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• Interest rates and exchange rates 
The world real interest rate is declining over the fifty-year period. This is due to global aging. 
As a result the world saving investment equilibrium is tilted more and more toward a lower 
equilibrium rate. This downward trend provides the general profile of regional real interest 
rates (figure 8). The hierarchy of regional real interest rates is linked to the rate of change of 
the real exchange rates. The real interest rates regulate investment and saving flows. The gap 
between investment and saving is the current account balance of each region. It is financed by 
capital flows whose amounts are such that yield differentials between different regions cancel 
out in every period. 
 
Figure 8: 
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The world financial equilibrium allocates capital flows that finance current account 
imbalances modulated by real exchange rate changes. Net foreign assets affect exchange 
rates. They move with the net financial positions of the regions to create future surpluses or 
deficits, so that current accounts are balanced in the very long run, i.e. there is no more 
accumulation of net foreign assets or debts. Real exchange rates appreciate relatively to North 
America in the two regions that have consistently an ownership ratio higher than North 
America (figure 9). Nevertheless, except in these two regions and in Russia, the latter due to 
terms of trade effects, exchange rate changes are not much sensitive to the stocks of financial 
assets. Furthermore because Balassa effects are weak in the model, the paths of the exchange 
rates are mostly parallel to the one of North America. In the model the observed implicit 
dollar pegging of emerging market country currencies is here to stay. 
 
Figure 9  
Evolution of Real Exchange Rate (2000-2050)
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• Capital flows and stocks 
The ownership ratio is the ratio of the aggregate wealth accumulated by households in the 
region to the capital stock laid out in the region. Hence a ratio above one is tantamount to a 
creditor position against the rest of the world, a ratio less than one to a debtor position. 
Despite the general interdependence of prices one can roughly say that the world interest rate 
is the price which equilibrates the world financial market as a whole, matching total aggregate 
wealth and world capital stock. 
Cumulative current account balances mainly determine the ownership ratios. The most 
striking feature is the divergent profile of North America. It is due to an assumed change in 
household behavior. The deficit in the early years of the century is, as every one knows, due 
mainly to the low saving rate of households in the US. It has been assumed that this behavior 
will not be sustainable in the long run. American households will converge to the saving 
behavior observed in other regions in the early decades. With this structural change and with a 
population consistently younger than in Japan and Europe, the rise in saving in North America 
is conveyed into a double improvement in the current account balance (figure 10) and the 
ownership ratio (figure 11).  
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The main teaching for the other regions is a shrinking of the discrepancies in current accounts 
along the half-century. Japan and Western Europe remain continuously in surplus but less and 
less with the augmentation of their dependency ratio. The Mediterranean region is in surplus 
for most of the time but goes into a slight deficit in the last two decades. Africa, India and 
Eastern Europe, with large current account deficits at the start of the century, are reducing it 
as long as their growth rate is diminishing and their households save more because they get 
older and richer. 
 
Figure 10  
Evolution of Current Account Balance (percentage of World GDP) :
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Ownership ratios do not show the same converging pattern. The building of a strong creditor 
position in North America stands out. The slight improvement in the debtor position of Africa 
and Eastern Europe stems from the steady reduction of the deficit in those two regions. In 
India, where the improvement is less pronounced, the ownership ratio is continuously 
deteriorating. India will become the largest debtor according to this measure in the last decade 
before 2050. 
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Figure 11  
Ownership Ratio
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• Foreign trade 
In INGENUE tradable goods are intermediary. Regions export on a world market where a 
fictive world producer “produces” a world intermediate good. They compete on their 
domestic markets against imports of the world intermediate goods. Therefore the 
competitiveness of each region depends on the terms of trade against the world producer 
whose price is itself an average of intermediate goods prices in the different regions. 
Three regions have ever-rising terms of trade, i.e. loss of competitiveness: Japan, Western 
Europe, Russia. The other regions have constant or slightly declining terms of trade (figure 
12). The weak growth in the three former regions pushes prices upwards. 
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Figure 12  
Terms of Trade (2000-2050)
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In Japan and Western Europe those rising prices generate the widening trade deficit to match 
the demand of intermediate goods by the final goods sector. (figure 13). In Russia 
intermediary products are primary commodities in strong world demand. It ensues that the 
valuing effect of the terms of trade takes over. After deteriorating alongside Japan and 
Western Europe, the Russian trade balance turns around to an increasing surplus thereafter. 
Most other regions with little change in competitiveness improve their trade balance, moving 
from deficit to surplus. 
 
Figure 13 
Evolution of Trade Balance (percentage of regional GDP) :
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V. EXPLORING THE IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
OF FASTER CATCHING-UP IN CHINA AND INDIA 
China and India have the long-run potential to be the world leaders in growth rate for a 
considerable time to come. Their huge human resources and their attractiveness to foreign 
investment as a vector of diffusion of technological progress will make these very large 
countries the engines of a world growth regime. It is worth studying scenarios grounded on 
this hypothesis to assess the magnitude of spillover in the rest of the world and to figure out 
what an accelerated development in China and India implies for the global saving investment 
balance. 
1. Hypotheses for a faster catching-up in China and India 
A stronger momentum in the growth process is relevant because the baseline scenario is 
somewhat conservative. China and India are the centers of their INGENUE regions. Their 
momentum will benefit primarily the regions that integrate around them. Therefore the figures 
illustrating a stronger growth in TFP in China and India are calibrated for the regions we call 
“Chinese World” and “Indian World”. They are depicted in comparison to baseline on figure 
14. 
In the first half century China is poised to higher TFP growth than its baseline profile. The 
Chinese government knows very well that an upgrading of the value-added content of 
production is required to sustain the same growth rate or so as in the last ten years for about 
twenty more years. Meanwhile the growth of the labor force is fast decelerating and will turn 
negative in 2025. Structural reforms are in full swing to meet this challenge. If successful they 
will make China the second world economy twenty years onwards. It is why TFP growth is 
depicted on figure 14 at 2,2% in the Chinese World area until 2025 before slowing down 
gently. Such a profile means catching-up the level of Japanese TFP in 2100. 
India has much more time to spend so to speak. The Indian labor force will grow for a long 
time to come because the demographic transition is far from being completed, making India 
the most populous country in the second half of the century. Conversely India is a laggard in 
structural reforms. Mass education is still very weak and social infrastructures are cruelly 
lacking. Furthermore the decentralized political institutions do not tolerate abrupt turnarounds 
in policies. It is why we suppose that Indian TFP growth is modestly enhanced above baseline 
but the higher rate will last well over 2100. Such a profile means catching-up the level of 
Japanese TFP in 2150. 
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Figure 14  
Total Factor Productivity (annual growth) :
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This alternative to the baseline scenario is clearly supply side. However growth is a self-
sustaining endogenous process, as described in the following scheme.  
Therefore an inward-looking growth regime will increase consumption per capita for a larger 
and larger share of the population, as long as the labor force is enrolled in the modernized 
productive structure. The development of capitalism in OECD countries has shown that mass 
consumption requires a socialization of income via a welfare system in order to share the risks 
associated with a dynamic economy and to redistribute income amongst social groups and 
generations. It is why we study another variant where the embryo of public welfare systems 
existing in China and India, which covers a tiny fraction of the population, is spread 
progressively as far as modern capitalism expands in both countries. For analytical reasons 
this variant will be studied separately, then the conclusions are merged with the faster growth 
scenario. 
Because in INGENUE the social system focuses on retirement plans, we explore the 
consequences of a broadening of public pension systems in the Chinese and Indian regions of 
the model. In the baseline scenario, the participation rates in the labor market are based on the 
ILO data and are assumed to be constant after 2010. In this scenario, we consider that the 
countries included in these regions will develop their public pension systems in relation with 
the strong economic growth that they will enjoy all along the 21st century. In the model we 
choose a scenario that implies a convergence of the participation rate in the Chinese and 
Indian regions toward the level of North America for people aged between 60 years old and 
70 years old (see figure 15). This reform is implemented progressively between 2010 and 
2050.  
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Figure 15 : 
INGENUE 2 : Age-linked rate of employment coverging to North America :
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The ratio of the number of retirees to the people aged above 60 years old increases sharply 
during the first half of the 21st century. In 2000, this ratio represents 86% of the North 
America one in the Chinese world and 78% in the Indian world. As the number of retirees in 
these two Asian regions swells, the share of pensions to GDP climbs up as well. It does more 
so when social welfare broadens the public pension coverage (table 6).  
 
 
Table 6 : Share of pensions in GDP 
In % 2000 2050 (baseline) 2050 (expanded 
public pension) 
China World 
India World 
2.1 
3.2 
7.3 
7.7 
8.0 
9.2 
 
Correlatively the dependency ratio and the contribution rate weigh more (figure 16). The rise 
is more pronounced in India than in China. The reason is that the participation rates of Indian 
people aged 60 to 70 are higher than the rates of their Chinese counterparts before the reform 
takes root. It is also true that participation ratios are relatively low in India from age 20 to 50. 
Policies not studied here can be implemented to raise the participation of women in the labor 
force. They would offset the effects of the broader coverage of retirement benefits. 
 
 
Figure 16. Two measures of the expanding social welfare in China and India 
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2. Scenario of faster GDP growth in China and India 
The growth impact of the speed up in technological diffusion is straightforward. In the regions 
that experience the upward shift of the production frontier, people rationally expect a higher 
trend of future real income. Their intertemporal budget constraint becoming looser, they 
consume more from the beginning of the shift. The improvement in consumption per capita is 
stronger in China where the rise in TFP is larger (figure 17). The higher trend in consumer 
demand boosts capital accumulation. The subsequent higher capital intensity gives a further 
upward twist to the productivity of labor. The result is a sharp acceleration in GDP growth in 
China and a lesser in India to reach the new equilibrium in capital intensity. Then the growth 
profile in output follows the one in TFP (figure 18). 
 
Figure 17 
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Figure 18 
GDP Growth rate
(difference from baseline scenario)
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One can see on the figures 17 and 18 that the growth momentum in China and India entails an 
impact on the rest of the world. This impact finds its way through the change in the pattern of 
trade and financial flows and through the price structure. 
 
Figure 19 
Evolution of the Net Saving (in percentage of GNP)
(difference from baseline scenario)
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Because they expect persistently higher future streams of income, Chinese and, to a lesser 
degree, Indian households feel richer. Therefore they save less. The saving rate declines 
immediately, then recovers progressively as more people get more income. In the longer run 
the higher productivity makes room for both more consumption and more saving, as aging is 
conducive to wealth accumulation (figure 19). 
Less saving and more investment lead to a deterioration of the current account balance which 
slips into deficit. It will be reversed in China before the end of the first half century. Then the 
balance will generate larger surplus in the second half, while it remains in deficit in India 
(figure 20a). The other regions will mirror the Chinese profile so that, in the second half of the 
century, the “Chinese World” alone will have a surplus relative to the benchmark scenario. 
The change in the world saving investment balance will also impinge upon the net debtor or 
creditor positions measured by the ownership ratio. Relative to baseline, China and India will 
get more into debt and other regions will lend more in th first half of the century (figure 20b). 
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Figure 20a Figure 20b 
Evolution of Current Account Balance (percentage of regional GDP) :
(difference from baseline scenario)
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INGENUE 2 : Ownership Ratio
(Percentage point difference from baseline scenario)
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Finally in the aggregate the technologically-induced capital accumulation cum lower saving in 
Asia will drive the world interest rate upward. Because imperfection in credit markets entails 
a differentiation of regional real interest rates as a function of foreign indebtedness, the higher 
debt ratios in China and India will widen the range of interest rate differentials amongst the 
world regions. Therefore there will be a slightly upward trend in the world interest rate 
coupled with a widening of the spreads until 2025 (about the top of the growth rate in China) 
followed by a slow narrowing (figure 21a). 
Contrasting with domestic imperfections in credit markets, capital mobility via foreign 
exchange markets is assumed perfect. Thus interest rate parity holds leading to changes in the 
real exchange rates. Since the growth in productivity is higher than in the baseline scenario in 
China and India relatively to other regions, domestic prices decline in these regions relatively 
to the rest of the world in both traded and non-traded goods. Therefore both the terms of trade 
and the real exchange rate decline. The drift in the real exchange rate arises chiefly in China 
(figure 21b). Europe and Japan undergo a further but admittedly modest appreciation relative 
to North America. 
 
Figure 21a 
Regional annual real interest rate
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Figure 21b 
Evolution of Real Exchange Rate (2000-2050)
(difference from baseline scenario)
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3. Scenario of improved social welfare in China and India. 
Run relative to baseline for analytical clarity, this scenario exhibits variations qualitatively 
opposite to the precedent. But the deviations are of a smaller magnitude. This result backs up 
the view that improving the social welfare must go along with higher productivity growth. It 
is particularly relevant for China where the social framework of the communist regime was 
dismantled for the sake of a very strong capital accumulation. Building up a social welfare 
system is an integral part of an overhauling of growth onto the long-run development of 
domestic demand. 
Indeed, without the extra resources drawn from high growth in productivity, the 
implementation of public welfare is costly. Reducing the participation of older workers, an 
extended coverage of publicly-financed retirement will shrink the size of the labor force. 
Therefore the growth rate will decline relative to baseline until 2050 where the reform is 
completed. 
This supply side effect will be matched on the demand side by a change in the allocation of 
household income. Because they will have to finance both a higher dependency ratio with 
higher taxes and a wealth accumulation to provide future income for a longer retirement life, 
households consume less and save more. While social welfare is expanding until 2050, 
consumption per capita declines in China then stabilizes. It goes on declining in India to the 
end of the century because the participation of people in the 60-70 age group is larger than in 
China. It takes more time to reach the standard of North America (figure 22). Lower growth 
in China and India drags down the rest of the world though admittedly modestly. 
Correlatively the saving investment balance is changed worldwide. Because saving is 
increased  and investment lowered, real interest rates decline significantly in China and India 
in the first half of the century; Their subsequent recovery is not enough to return to the 
benchmarl level. Thus the world interest rate drifts donward a bit (figure 23). Interests rates 
slightly decline in all regions with less investment to finance. They do it most in regions 
which were more indebted in the baseline scenario, namely Africa and Eastern Europe. 
Conversely interests rates decline less in creditor regions, Japan and Western Europe. 
 
Figure 22a 
Private consumption per capita (level)
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Figure 22b 
GDP per capita level (2000-2050)
(Percentage point difference from baseline scenario)
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Figure 23 
Regional annual real interest rate
(difference from baseline scenario) 
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Real exchange rate changes are driven by the changing pattern of interest rate differentials. 
Exchange rates appreciate in India and China after an initial depreciation. They carry along all 
the exchange rates of debtor regions while they depreciate a bit in Japan and Western Europe 
(figure 24). From the perspective of the supply/demand equililibrium on the final goods 
market, the initial depreciation of the exchange rate could be explained by the demand shock 
coming from the negative effect on the life-cycle income of the Chinese and Indian 
households. This fall of the demand of their final good appears clearly with the instantaneous 
decrease of consumption per capita (figure 22a). The appreciation of the exchange rate is then 
induced by the negative supply shock (coming from the working age population decrease). As 
can be seen on figure 22b, this adjustment occurs only after 2015 in the two Asian regions 
whereas the negative demand shock occurs as soon as 2000.  
The effects are even more clearcut in international capital flows and foreign investment 
positions. The current account balance and the ownership ratio improve in China and India 
which undertake the welfare reform and they deteriorate in all other regions (figures 25a and 
25b). it shows plainly that the way the reform has been defined, i.e. enlarging the coverage of 
welfare instead of augmenting the replacement ratio of pensions over wages, is an incentive to 
save more and spend less. Financial positions are improved as a consequence. 
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Figure 24 
Evolution of Real Exchange Rate (2000-2050)
(difference from baseline scenario)
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Figure 25a Figure 25b 
Evolution of Current Account Balance (percentage of World GDP) :
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INGENUE 2 : Ownership Ratio
(Percentage point difference from baseline scenario)
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Since financial variables move in opposite directions with the supply side reforms on the one 
hand and the welfare reforms on the other hand, compounding them in a comprehensive 
structural policy of modernization makes a more balanced picture of the growth process in 
Asia and of its impact on the rest of the world. This is the substance of a world growth regime 
that is a credible alternative to the conservative baseline scenario. 
Figures 26a and 26b sum up the effects on growth and on saving of the combined scenario in 
Asia, focusing on the regions undergoing the structural changes. On these figures the profiles 
of the growth cum social reform scenarios are presented jointly with the profiles of the 
baseline scenario. 
In China the speed of technological diffusion raises the growth rate all over the 50 year period 
relative to the baseline scenario despite the cost of social reform. In India the slower rate of 
diffusion and the lower participation rate in the middle-aged groups leaves only a small 
difference. 
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The saving rate is the core variable for the impact on capital flows. In the combined scenario 
the overall change is the outcome of two countervailing influences. In India they almost 
cancel out. In China the lower saving linked to the technological diffusion dominates until 
2035. Then the higher saving due to the extension of retirement takes over. 
 
Figure 26a Figure 26b 
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Figures 27a and 27b depict the evolution of international variables. On real exchange rates the 
speedup in productivity growth dominate the countervailing effet of social reforms. This is 
more visible in China where the growth scenario is based upon a faster catchingup than in 
India. With higher productivity growth domestic prices decline relatively to the benchmark 
region (North America). Therefore the real exchange rate depreciates from 2015 onward 
instead of appreciating. On the contrary, the two parts of the combined scenario have effects 
on net capital flows which cancel each other, leaving no significant net impact on the 
ownership ratio. 
 
Figure 27a Figure 27b 
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CONCLUSION 
Our investigation in the long-run prospect of the world economy has shown how far a 
sustainable world growth regime is from the present unbalanced stage of globalization. We 
have developed the conjecture of a world growth regime based upon demographic and 
technological forces stemming from the big emerging market economies in Asia. The growth 
regime so depicted will depend on capital migration to the faster-growing countries, not on 
labor migration into aging rich economies. The capital flows involved will substantiate an 
intergenerational saving transfer to the huge number of people who aspire to get access to 
Western standard of life. 
Such a saving investment pattern is the only way to resume a convergence process interrupted 
by the financial crises of the 1980’s and 1990’s. Whole regions, which were victims of the 
malfunctioning of the international financial system, have rightly reacted in becoming capital 
exporters to reduce their dollar debts and accumulate large reserves to cushion against 
financial instability. But, on top of fuelling real estate bubbles and financing an unhealthy 
slump in US household saving, this paradoxical pattern of capital flows will undoubtedly 
hamper the growth potential of emerging market countries if unduly prolonged. But there is 
no way that the present pattern of capital flows will reverse itself spontaneously without 
plunging the world in recession. The world economy cannot be set on a virtuous growth track 
without considerable changes in the three most important economic regions of the world. 
Furthermore substantial changes in the international financial system should also be on the 
agenda. Here are some policy lessons that can be drawn from the prospective analysis using 
the INGENUE2 model. 
• The baseline scenario points out to the need of restoring a sustainable saving 
investment balance in the US. 
A steady increase in U.S. saving is required to reduce the current account deficit to a 
sustainable level (about 3% of GDP) and eventually turn it into surplus in future decades. This 
structural change would certainly be accompanied by a real depreciation of the dollar across 
the board. In our benchmark scenario the trend is most pronounced against the euro and the 
yen. A real depreciation would improve private saving through several channels. Profit 
margins would rise in the traded goods sector if there were some pricing-to-market. Domestic 
demand would slow down with real wages. The changing structure of demand in favor of 
non-traded goods with the decrease in the relative price of those goods could mitigate the 
negative impact of the lesser momentum in domestic demand on employment. Yet, a 
reduction in the budget deficit is the surest way to improve national saving, because Ricardian 
equivalence appears to be weak in the US.  
• The baseline scenariodepicts Western Europe as a low growth region on 
persisting in inefficent policies. 
Western Europe has a declining working-age population and cannot hope much on catching-
up as a factor of growth because the region is relatively close to the technology frontier. The 
best source of growth potential would stem from boosting innovation. That was the Lisbon 
Agenda, which was not implemented, due to financial contraints, perennial bickering on the 
federal budget and lack of political leadership. Such an innovation-prone growth requires 
sustaining a much more ambitious level of R&D and higher education spending, that only the 
Scandinavian countries have achieved. Better links between public and private firm research 
is also called for on selected projects that can be financed by multiple sources: origination via 
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a restructured Union budget, borrowing on capital markets by the European Investment Bank 
with a multiplier effect on institutional investors. 
Western Europe also needs a much more active countercyclical economic policy, because 
innovative firms cannot attract equity capital in a lacklustre macroeconomic environment. It 
has been a persistent impediment in Europe high profits and low investment have coexisted 
after the crash of the “new Economy”. More expansive macroeconomic policies would enable 
to raise temporarily actual growth above potential in order to shrinken unemployment 
significantly and to stimulate the incentive to invest in the private sector. But this stance of 
economic policy is quite at odds with the doctrine reigning in Brussels and Frankfurt and with 
the sharp divergences between member countries of the E.U. 
• The baseline scenario shows that the world growth regime in the XXIth 
century will have its engine in regions with a huge labor force and a fast 
catching-up. 
Growth in Asia relies excessively on exports. It must be redeployed toward domestic demand. 
With Japan getting out of deflation a move in the right direction can arise if consumer demand 
recovers. In the developed countries of Asia which underwent the Asian crisis, there is also a 
lack of consumer demand. Promoting financial reforms to set up well-regulated credit systems 
for the private sectors could enhance consumer credit. In China and India the growth 
scenarios that we have studied depend on multiple structural reforms. Along with the 
strengthening of the financial sector, structural policies hard to agree upon and time-
consuming to implement are are paramount. Investing in infrastructure and mass education 
helps remove the impediments to technological diffusion. Initiating long-standing social 
policies to vastly extend the coverage of social welfare systems lays out a social sharing of 
economic risks that will entail a downward trend in private saving and an upward trend in the 
weight of consumption in GDP. 
• In the baseline scenario capital flows are smoothly regulated by yield 
differentials because global financial markets operate under long-run rational 
expectations. This has obviously not been the case in actual financial systems. 
Because dollar borrowing gave rise to twin crises in currency and banking markets, emerging 
market countries have consistently reduced their dollar debt and built up comfortable reserves 
to recover their economic sovereignty. This financial trend is at odds with the pattern of 
growth underlying the efficient intergenerational worldwide transfer of saving underlain by a 
growth regime spurred by fast catching-up. But, in order to resume their normal pattern, 
capital flows are not only dependent on the structural reforms hinted at hereabove. Global 
financial markets should take a longer-run view and share risk better. For borrowing 
countries, they could make their currencies more available to foreign investors as long as they 
make progress in their domestic financial reforms. Borrowing in domestic currencies or in 
other currencies of the same region linked by monetary agreements would withdraw much of 
the instability that had plagued the first stage of financial globalization. Such a move would 
make the international monetary system more multilateral and would demand some 
mechanism of global governance. 
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APPENDIX: The regions in the INGENUE 2 world model : 
 
In the INGENUE 2 model, the World is divided in 10 regions according mainly 
togeographical and demographic criteria. These regions are labelled : Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe, North America, Latin America, Japan, Mediterranean World, Chinese World, 
Africa, Russian World and Indian World. The content of each region is detailed below. 
 
"Western Europe": 'Channel Islands', 'Denmark', 'Finland', 'Iceland', 'Ireland', 'Norway', 
'Sweden', 'United Kingdom', 'Greece', 'Italy', 'Malta', 'Portugal', 'Spain', 'Austria', 'Belgium', 
'France', 'Germany' (East and West), 'Luxembourg', 'Netherlands', 'Switzerland'. 
 
"Eastern Europe": 'Estonia', 'Latvia', Lithuania', 'Bulgaria', 'Czech Republic', 'Hungary', 
'Poland', 'Romania', 'Slovakia', 'Slovenia', 'Albania', 'Bosnia and Herzegovina', 'Croatia', 
'TFYR Macedonia', 'Yugoslavia'. 
 
"North America": 'Canada', 'United States of America', 'Australia', 'New Zealand', 
'Melanesia', 'Fiji', 'New Caledonia', 'Papua New Guinea', Solomon Islands', 'Vanuatu', 
'Micronesia', 'Guam', 'Polynesia', 'French Polynesia', 'Samoa'. 
 
"Latin America": 'Argentina', 'Bolivia', 'Brazil', 'Chile', 'Colombia', 'Ecuador', 'French 
Guiana', 'Guyana', 'Paraguay', 'Peru', 'Suriname', 'Uruguay', 'Venezuela', 'Belize', 'Costa Rica', 
'El Salvador', 'Guatemala', 'Honduras', 'Mexico', 'Nicaragua', 'Panama', 'Bahamas', 'Barbados', 
'Cuba', 'Dominican Republic', 'Guadeloupe', 'Haiti', 'Jamaica', 'Martinique', 'Netherlands 
Antilles', 'Puerto Rico', 'Saint Lucia', 'Trinidad and Tobago'. 
 
Japan  
 
"Mediterranean World" : 'Algeria', 'Egypt', 'Libyan Arab Jamahiriya', 'Morocco', , 'Tunisia', 
'Western Sahara', 'Armenia', 'Azerbaijan', 'Bahrain', 'Cyprus', 'Georgia', 'Iraq', 'Iran', 'Israel', 
'Jordan', 'Kuwait', 'Lebanon', 'Occupied Palestinian Territory', 'Oman', 'Qatar', 'Saudi Arabia', 
'Syrian Arab Republic', 'Turkey', 'United Arab Emirates', 'Yemen', 'Turkmenistan', 
'Uzbekistan' 'Kyrgyzstan'. 
 
"Chinese World": 'China', 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea', 'Mongolia', 'Republic of 
Korea', 'Brunei Darussalam', 'Cambodia', 'East Timor', 'Lao People's Democratic Republic', 
'Myanmar', 'Philippines', 'Singapore', 'Thailand', 'Viet Nam'. 
 
"Africa": 'Burundi', 'Comoros', 'Djibouti', 'Eritrea', 'Ethiopia', 'Kenya', 'Madagascar', 
'Malawi', 'Mauritius', 'Mozambique', 'R\'{e}union', 'Rwanda', 'Somalia', 'Uganda', 'Tanzania', 
'Zambia', 'Zimbabwe', 'Angola', 'Cameroon', 'Central African Republic', 'Chad', 'Congo', 
'Democratic Republic of the Congo', 'Equatorial Guinea', 'Gabon', 'Botswana', 'Lesotho', 
'Namibia', 'South Africa', 'Swaziland', 'Benin', 'Burkina Faso', 'Cape Verde', 'Côte d'Ivoire', 
'Gambia', 'Ghana', 'Guinea', 'Guinea-Bissau', 'Liberia', 'Mali', 'Mauritania', 'Niger', 'Nigeria', 
'Senegal', 'Sierra Leone', 'Togo', 'Sudan'. 
 
"Russian World": 'Belarus', 'Russian Federation', 'Ukraine', 'Kazakhstan', 'Republic of 
Moldova', 
 
"Indian World": 'India', 'Afghanistan', 'Bangladesh', 'Bhutan', 'Maldives', 'Nepal', 'Pakistan', 
'Sri Lanka', 'Tajikistan', 'Indonesia', 'Malaysia'. 
